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Members of the faculty and students

My aim today is not to paint a gruesome picture of intrigue, nor to evolve a web of intricate thoughts about "cloak and dagger" activities. Neither shall I try to give you an evasive presentation about a field of endeavor about which too little is known by the people of our Nation. Much of this lack of knowledge is attributable to a false concept of security, which espouses a hidden philosophy to canopy all intelligence activities. In reality, the intelligence process itself is the loser by such a system, since we fail to win the confidence of those, like yourselves, who can contribute much to our efforts and whose assistance we should seek rather than stifle. Furthermore, by operating under a cloak of "hush-hush" texture the intelligence organizations are vulnerable to receive criticism which often belongs in other places. When our function in the framework of government is not understood, we readily become the convenient dumping ground for blame which frequently would not be placed on us if our duties, functions, responsibilities were better explained and more clearly recognized. This business of intelligence is a practicable integral part of good government. The decision to be taken by an individual before he embarks on a particular course of action is customarily based upon all pertinent information indicating the benefits and detriments to be derived from such an undertaking. When business concerns determine policy, their actions are likewise premised upon all available factual data showing, for example, the profit or loss potential, the morale factors, the goodwill to be achieved, the probable response of competitors. The information which individuals and

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business concerns receive to enable them to answer many fundamental questions must be sifted and weighed before its usefulness is justified. Only after such a process can we affirm that the decisions are "informed decisions" based upon tested knowledge.

So it is with Government where policies of strategic and factual nature must be based upon sound information of all available facts. The facts which concern Government are the capabilities, vulnerabilities, intentions and policies of all other nations, especially our actual or potential enemies. Thus, intelligence which has justifiably been called "the nation's first line of defense" is the process of collecting, selecting, evaluating, analyzing, integrating, and interpreting bits and pieces of information to produce the most authoritative appraisal of a particular situation. It is not crystal-ball gazing or magic wand-waving, but plain, practicable hard work. Intelligence services are not created to just sit and look intelligent. Basic to all intelligence activity is getting the information called simply, the collection process. This embraces all steps essential to gathering from overt, or at times, covert sources all data which is needed by or may be of assistance to those writing reports or estimates. I used the words "at times" purposefully because the vast bulk of information is gleaned from overt sources. When all available information of the required type is collected, it is then scanned and segregated by the step called selection so that each research person or estimator will get what is appropriate to his particular need. However, before being used by the researcher the reports or information must be critically examined to assess their inherent meaning and accuracy. This stage is known as evaluation. To make the items most

useful to those actually producing intelligence an analysis must then be made to identify the similarity or relationship of the pieces of evaluated information. Then the actual intelligence estimate begins to take form by the integration of the related and essential elements to produce intelligence. Finally, by interpretation the conclusions are put in their true perspective and their significance is indicated.

While this whole process may sound colorless and abstruse it is far from being such. Even though the machinery of intelligence grinds quietly in a cloistered background, the collectors, the analysts, the researchers, the estimators are all performing a type of activity which has an interest and appeal that does not wane. The scenery of national and international events is constantly changing. Policies of yesterday are superseded by the decisions of today. And in the midst of this kaleidoscopic passage of incidents, intelligence, if it is adequate, is ahead of the happenings. Thus do the persons in the intelligence field possess a unique responsibility for objectively appraising all situations so as to guide the policy makers in ways of firmness and potency.

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In the world of today, divided into two broad categories, half-slave and half-free, our country stands at the helm of the freedom-loving nations, conscious of the fact that no nation ever had greater responsibility for the ~~retention~~ of freedom, and no nation ever had more opportunity for doing good than we possess. In such a worldwide position our policies must be formulated and implemented in a fashion to beget confidence in the system of which we are a part. This can be accomplished only when the policies are

based on tested knowledge which is sound intelligence. For years we possessed a brand of naive innocence about the function of intelligence, partly attributable to our preoccupation with internal growth and development, and our geographic isolation, locked within the broad expanses of two great oceans. This historic simplicity vanished with the reality of Pearl Harbor. Besides armies and navies, the other great powers have always maintained intelligence systems to unmask the intentions of their actual or potential enemies. Thus with the coming of World War II, and not until then, did the United States realize that intelligence was an essential instrumentality in the conduct of our national policy, and a vital element in our national security system. Then did we see with clarity that we had been using the intelligence process for years as an integral part of less important activities. The "scouting" of football opponents had been considered an honorable and essential preparation for playing the game. In the field of baseball we named him the best coach who could quickly catch on to the signals of the opponent. In our political campaigns stringent efforts were exerted to get advance information about the speeches and other official pronouncements of the opposition party. It was not, therefore, too difficult for us to recognize that the policies of our Government in regard to foreign countries should likewise be based upon the information obtained by "scouting" the actual or proposed courses of action of foreign governments and by diagnosing their plays in the international field. Accordingly, early in World War II, our public officials uniformly acknowledged the need for strengthening our intelligence activities and hence little or no opposition was encountered in enlarging the intelligence

components of the Army (G-2), Navy (ONI), and of granting more power and authority to the Office of Strategic Services, and the Foreign Economic Administration. The Air Force, as a separate arm of the military, was not yet born. Even though these activities were strengthened they remained uncoordinated. It is indeed a significant coincidence that the war was fought and ended before the first effort was made to unify the goals of the diverse intelligence activities of the Government. Though the Departments of State, War and Navy agreed on the need for centralizing all foreign information, a fight, not unusual in Washington, began as to where such an agency should be placed in the structure of the Executive Departments, and who should be responsible for control of its operations. Two major views were presented: (a) One, by the Head of the Office of Strategic Services, who contended that the centralized intelligence activity should be a completely independent agency not answerable to any department of government, should accordingly get its funds direct from Congress, and operate under a single Director reporting direct to the President. (b) The other suggestion, a somewhat modified version of the OSS proposal, came from the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommending that a National Intelligence Authority be established composed of the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and the personal representative of the President. The funds for the NIA were to come from the Departments of State, War and Navy.

The view of the Joint Chiefs prevailed, and on January 22, 1946, by Executive Order, President Truman established the National Intelligence Authority, under which was set up the Central Intelligence Group, whose director took orders from the members of the NIA and hence had little more

than administrative power in running his organization. After a year and a half of such operation the National Security Act was passed on July 26, 1947 establishing the National Security Council and, under the Council, the Central Intelligence Agency. Thus, even though the main function of the Council is advisory to the President on problems concerning national security, it does direct one organization of Government - the CIA, which was brought into existence to coordinate "the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security ..."

Under the direction of the National Security Council the duties of CIA are enumerated as six in number:

1. "To advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security."

Comment: This is a type of broad, gratuitous function which may be embarked upon at any time by CIA on its own initiative or on the suggestion or request of others.

2. "To make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to national security."

Comment: In this undertaking the Director of Central Intelligence takes a definite stand for strengthening present functions, eliminating unnecessary duplications, or amending current procedures. Note that functions one and two are government-wide in scope and are not hemmed in by pertaining only to recognized intelligence activities such as G-2 of Army or ONI of Navy.

3. "To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing intelligence agencies and facilities: ..."

Comment: This is the most important function of CIA because by this process are evolved the National Intelligence Estimates.

4. "To protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

Comment: Because of the great importance attached to this responsibility the Act places this duty specifically on the shoulders of the "Director of Central Intelligence."

5. "To perform, for the benefit of existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally:"

Comment: This recognizes CIA in a unique category as the organization to accomplish an activity that can help more than one intelligence agency.

6. "To perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

Comment: This is the type of concluding statement found in many statutes. It really adds nothing more than a polite ending, since without the statement CIA would undoubtedly do whatever the NSC directed.

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In carrying out these functions CIA has certain prescribed limitations which are a blessing rather than a hindrance, because they tend to strengthen the authority of CIA in the field of intelligence, and facilitate the implementation of directives.

First: CIA does not free wheel with independent power. Its advice and recommendation to the National Security Council go first to the Heads of Intelligence of the Army, Navy, Air Force, State, AEC, the FBI and the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Since the "advice" or "recommendation" would undoubtedly affect some phase of work in which these intelligence chiefs had prime interest, their foreknowledge and support of the CIA position makes the ultimate step of carrying out the action, after NSC approval, a comparatively easy task.

Second: CIA does not have internal security functions. Specifically the National Security Act enunciates "That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions:" It is only where the police power and the intelligence activity are blended into a unity that a Gestapo or MVD develops.

Third: CIA does not supersede, minimize, or duplicate the intelligence functions of the departments and agencies. Its very existence should add strength and breadth to the departmental functions because by CIA's coordinating function each will know more clearly its task in the total governmental framework by possessing a fuller and keener comprehension of what other agencies are doing in the same or related fields.

Fourth: CIA does not perform common services just to aid the administrative management activities of government generally. These "services of



common concern" must be for the benefit of EXISTING intelligence agencies and must be embarked upon only when determined by the National Security Council.

Under these four limitations, the six functions of CIA already enumerated may be grouped into three categories:

1. Advice (Recommendation)
2. Preparation of National Intelligence Estimates.
3. Performance of Common Services.

These three serve the prime goal of CIA viz. Coordination. Sufficient has already been said about advice to N.S.C. and performing services of common concern. A few observations are therefore pertinent to the production of national intelligence estimates. In the past a great deal of time and energy was expended in attempting to formulate definitions and to differentiate between departmental and national intelligence. Most of these efforts proved fruitless since the application of the definitions to actual cases was frequently debatable. The departments were prone to say that CIA was producing estimates which were "departmental" in scope and CIA in turn justified its position by retaliatory quirks that the departments were writing National Estimates which fell within the bailiwick of CIA. This jurisdictional problem has now been overcome by a clear recognition that in the Executive Departments and Agencies there is a Federal Intelligence System of which the various intelligence activities in the departments and the Central Intelligence Agency are a part. Hence, the estimate which provides a basis for national policy is a National Estimate. The preparation of such an estimate does not mean a solo production job for CIA. Though the Director of Central Intelligence possesses final responsibility for the content of

the National Estimate, in its preparation CIA must depend upon the collaboration of experts and the cooperation of departments, and thus CIA's action reflects the welding into a unity of the best intelligence opinion, based upon all available information.

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This is the continuing challenge for the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the departments. To meet it we must realize that in this atomic and hydrogen age intelligence requires the use of all types of men who are capable of appraising, in objective and disinterested manner, the economic, social, financial, political, military and industrial developments of a country.

None will question the essentiality of intelligence in time of war to provide reliable information regarding the enemy strength and weaknesses, his capabilities, plans and actions. We must possess like conviction that in time of peace intelligence is equally essential. To prevent war, to maintain peace we must act on truth, on fact and not on rumor. Rumor may suggest policies of error. To achieve this end of solidarity and factual basis for policy we must have intelligence that commands recognition and respect which can be gotten only by those who have a zest for the activity and prepare themselves accordingly. In the vineyard of intelligence, the workers can be the victors over war or the saviors of peace.



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